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Layered Rights: Robertson v. Thomson
Gregory R. Hagen†
In Robertson v. Thomson Corp., 1 the Supreme exercising other rights in the Copyright Act. For
Court of Canada (‘‘the Court’’) considered ‘‘whether example, when the sound recording of a musical work is
newspaper publishers are entitled as a matter of law to reproduced, the underlying work is also reproduced.
republish in electronic databases freelance articles they When that sound recording is performed in public, as
have acquired for publication in their newspapers — background music, for example, there is also a perform-
without compensation to the authors and without their ance of the underlying work. 8
consent’’. 2 Curiously, while deciding that publishers are Layered copyrights are generally considered to be
not entitled to reproduce the individual articles without independent of each other in the sense that the existence
the consent of the freelancers, 3 it also held that the pub- of a right in one person does not imply the existence of
lishers do have a right to reproduce the articles in a CD- another right in that same person. Put another way,
ROM database ‘‘as a part of those collective works — copyrights at one layer are subject to copyrights at
their newspapers . . . ’’ independently of whether the another layer. For example, a maker’s right as specified in
scope of authorization of the freelancers extends to section 18 of the Copyright Act to reproduce a sound
reproduction in electronic databases. 4 The Court recording does not imply that the maker has the right
observed that, at its core, the case concerned competing under section 3 of the Copyright Act  to reproduce the
layered rights of publishers in their newspaper, and free- underlying work that is embodied in the sound
lancers in their articles contained in the newspaper. 5 In recording. As a result, the maker of the sound recording
this comment, however, the author argues that by cannot reproduce the sound recording, despite the
grounding the right of publishers to reproduce news- maker’s right of reproduction, without the authorization
paper articles in their right to reproduce their newspa- of the owner of the right to reproduce the musical work
pers — independently of the scope of the authorization embodied in the sound recording. 9
to reproduce the articles — the Court wrongly abandons
Robertson can be understood as being aboutlayered rights as they are ordinarily understood in the
whether the result regarding sound recordings analo-Copyright Act. 6
gously holds with respect to newspapers and the articlesThe layering of copyrights is illustrated by the case contained in them; namely, whether a newspaper pub-of the relationship between rights in works and rights in lisher can reproduce its newspaper in an electronicother subject matter (the latter being so-called ‘‘related’’ database without the authorization of the owners of theor ‘‘neighbouring rights’’). 7 Rights exist in works under copyright in any articles contained in it. 10 The issue arosesection 3 of the Copyright Act and also in other subject because Robertson, a freelance writer, wrote two articlesmatter, namely, performers’ performances (ss. 15 & 26), that were published in the Globe and Mail and latersound recordings (s. 18), and communications signals reproduced in three databases: Info Globe Online,(s. 21). CPI.Q, and a CD-ROM.11 No explicit terms regarding
The layered nature of rights in copyright law results copyright were agreed upon, either orally or in writing,
from the fact that some subject matter of copyright is but it was conceded that Robertson authorized the pub-
layered. Subject matter is layered when its existence lication of the articles in the print newspaper. 12 Rob-
depends upon the existence of other subject matter. For ertson objected to the reproduction of her articles in the
example, the existence of a sound recording of a per- databases, however, and instituted a class action on
formance of a musical work obviously depends upon the behalf of all contributors to the Globe and Mail from
existence of the performance and of the work embodied 1944 and thereafter. 13 From the perspective of the Globe
in it. Thus, one can think of the sound recording as, and Mail, the reproduction of the articles in electronic
metaphorically, layered over the work and the per- databases was grounded in the right to reproduce its
former’s performance of the work. newspaper, which contained the articles. From the per-
Given the layering of subject matter, the exercise of spective of the freelance authors of the articles, the repro-
rights in sound recordings, performers’ performances, duction of the newspaper was a reproduction of the
and communications signals often necessarily involves articles, which was an infringement of the right to
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reproduce the articles held by the freelancers, such as — which may be an exercise of a right held by someone
Robertson. 14 other than the publisher.
The Court found that a reproduction of the articles Third, the independence of copyrights holds that
in a CD-ROM was not an infringement15 while the the possession of one right does not imply the possession
reproduction of the articles in the other databases was an of another right. Independence holds, for example, with
infringement. 16 Importantly, the Court found that it was respect to the relationship of related rights and works.
the Globe and Mail’s right to reproduce its newspaper Indeed, the independence of the rights in articles and the
(containing the articles) in the CD-ROM,17 irrespective newspaper in which they are contained is confirmed by
of whether the reproduction of the articles in the CD- the Court:
ROM was within the scope of Robertson’s authoriza- Pursuant to the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42,
tion. 18 In arriving at this judgment, however, the Court newspaper publishers own the copyright in their newspa-
pers and have a right to reproduce a newspaper or a substan-appears to have abandoned the idea that copyright in
tial part of that newspaper but do not have the right,newspapers is layered in the manner described above.
without the consent of the author, to reproduce individual
This abandonment of layering can be explained as freelance articles. 24
an attempt to reconcile the possession of copyrights in It follows from the principle of independence thatthe newspaper and copyrights in the articles contained the right of the publisher to reproduce the newspaperin the newspaper by distinct persons. The explanation does not imply the right to reproduce the articles con-begins, first, by noting that the Court recognized the tained in it, despite the fact that the articles must neces-existence of the two rights at issue: sarily be reproduced when the newspaper is reproduced
Plainly, freelance authors have the right to reproduce, (as a result of layering). The reproduction of the news-and authorize the reproduction of, their articles. Similarly, as
paper by the Globe and Mail without the authorizationthe holders of the copyright in their newspapers, the Pub-
of the owners of the underlying articles is, therefore, anlishers are entitled to ‘‘produce or reproduce the work or
any substantial part thereof in any material form infringement of the rights of the owners of the copy-
whatever’’. 19 rights in the articles. Nevertheless, the Court did not
draw this conclusion, for it also said that newspaperSecond, the rights in newspapers are layered. This is
publishers do have a limited right to publish the articlesbecause a newspaper is both a collection and a compila-
in electronic databases included in their right to publishtion of the articles that it contains. ‘‘Compilation’’ is
the newspapers, irrespective of whether the authoriza-defined as: 20
tion extends to reproduction in the databases:(a) a work resulting from the selection or arrangement
of literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works or of parts Their copyright over the newspapers they publish gives
thereof, or (b) a work resulting from the selection or arrange- them no right to reproduce, otherwise than as part of those
ment of data. collective works — their newspapers — the freelance articles
that appeared in them.25‘‘Collective work’’ is defined as:
(a) an encyclopaedia, dictionary, year book or similar How can this finding be reconciled with the princi-
work, (b) a newspaper, review, magazine or similar period- ples of layering and independence? It might appear that
ical, and (c) any work written in distinct parts by different the Court gives up the independence of layered rights.authors, or in which works or parts of works of different
On that account, the right to reproduce the underlyingauthors are incorporated. 21
articles is part of the right to reproduce the newspaper. 26Since newspapers are collections and compilations Yet, at the same time, the Court appears to give up theof articles, arguably, the reproduction of the whole news- principle of layered rights in the sense that, while therepaper reproduces its articles. In fact, the Court recog- may be a reproduction of the underlying articles whennized the layering of rights in newspapers and their arti- reproducing the newspaper, it is not a reproduction thatcles as follows: is an exercise of the rights of the owners of the under-
The Copyright Act establishes a regime of layered lying articles. Hence, on this view, there is no violation ofrights. Freelance authors who write newspaper articles retain
independence of rights after all.the copyright in their work while the publisher of the news-
paper acquires a copyright in the newspaper. 22 Not only does the judgment confirm the indepen-
While this statement says merely that both authors and dence of rights, 27 but also, for much of the judgment the
newspaper publishers possess rights in their respective Court describes how the right of reproduction is limited
works, clearly, the notion of layering suggests something by the form of reproduction. It follows on the Court’s
about the relationship between rights. Indeed, the Court reasoning that a reproduction of the articles is not neces-
referred to the distinct rights in compilations and their sarily a reproduction, in any material form whatever, of
contents as ‘‘overlapping’’. 23 It is suggested that rights in the newspaper. (Likewise, the reproduction of a news-
the newspaper and articles ‘‘overlap’’ or are ‘‘layered’’ paper may not be a reproduction in any material form of
because there cannot be a reproduction of the whole the underlying articles.) If there can be a reproduction of
newspaper without the reproduction of each of its article a work without it being a reproduction in any material
parts. Hence, the right to reproduce the entire newspaper form, then there is an issue as to whether the databases
cannot be exercised without also reproducing the articles are a reproduction in any material form of the articles
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and/or of the newspaper. This is close to the funda- Specifically, the Court limited the right of reproduc-
mental question posed by the Court: tion to those reproduced articles that are not decontex-
tualized to the point that they are no longer presented inThe real question then is whether the electronic
databases that contain articles from the Globe reproduce a manner that maintains their ‘‘intimate connection
the newspapers or merely reproduce the original articles. 28 with the rest of [the] newspaper’’. 36 This ‘‘intimacy’’,
‘‘nature’’, 37 or ‘‘essence’’ 38 must be preserved in order forThe answer given by the Court is that it depends upon
the right of reproduction to be applicable. 39 It arguedwhose originality is reproduced:
that the decontextualization of the articles in the InfoThe answer to this question lies in the determination of
Globe Online and CPI.Q made them more like a collec-whose ‘‘originality’’ is being reproduced: the freelance
author’s alone or the Publishers’ as a collective work?29 tion of individual articles, a collection of a different
nature than a reproduction in the form of a newspaper:The notion of originality was recently clarified by
the Court in CCH Canadian Limited v. Law Society of We again agree with the Publishers that their right to
reproduce a substantial part of the newspaper includes theUpper Canada. 30 There it said that originality was a
right to reproduce the newspaper without advertisements,quality of works that existed when they were produced
graphs and charts, or in a different layout and using differentwith the exercise of skill and judgment. 31 Further, origi- fonts. But it does not follow that the articles of the news-
nality in a compilation, such as a newspaper, exists only paper can be decontextualized to the point that they are no
longer presented in a manner that maintains their intimatein its form as an edited work rather than in the works
connection with the rest of that newspaper. In Info Globethat it contains:
Online and CPI.Q, articles from a given daily edition of the
Copyright protects originality of form or expression. A Globe are stored and presented in a database together with
compilation takes existing material and casts it in different thousands of other articles from different periodicals and
form. The arranger does not have copyright in the indi- different dates. And, these databases are expanding and
vidual components. However, the arranger may have copy- changing daily as more and more articles are added. These
right in the form represented by the compilation. 32 products are more akin to databases of individual articles
rather than reproductions of the Globe. Thus, in our view,While there is clearly skill and judgment both in the
the originality of the freelance articles is reproduced; theunderlying articles and in the newspaper (since copy- originality of the newspapers is not. 40right subsists in both), the Court held that, in the case of
The Court found, in contrast, that the reproductionthe Info Globe Online and CPI.Q databases, the origi-
of the newspaper in the CD-ROM did preserve thenality of the newspaper had not been reproduced, but
essence of the work, since it is essentially a compendiumthat the originality of the articles had been reproduced. 33
of daily newspaper editions. 41The reason the originality of the newspaper is repro-
duced in the case of the CD-ROM is that it preserves a This analysis may explain why, according to the
linkage to the original newspaper. The Court said: Court, the originality of the newspaper was not repro-
In our view, the CD-ROMs are a valid exercise of the duced in the Info Globe and CPI.Q databases but was
Globe’s right to reproduce its collective works (or a substan- reproduced in the CD-ROM. It does not explain, how-
tial part thereof) pursuant to s. 3(1) of the Copyright Act. ever, why the originality of the articles is not reproducedThe CD-ROMs, like Info Globe Online and CPI.Q, do not
in the CD-ROM, while it was reproduced in the case ofcontain advertisements, pictures or colour and are presented
the Info Globe and CPI.Q databases. Yet the Court saidin a different medium and format than the print edition.
The critical distinction, however, is that the CD-ROMs pre- that the ‘‘real question’’ in Robertson was whose origi-
serve the linkage to the original daily newspaper. 34 nality was being reproduced rather than whether there
As noted, in determining whether there was a sub- was authorization to reproduce the articles in the
stantial reproduction in this case, the Court placed databases. 42 A finding that the originality of the articles is
importance upon the fact that section 3 of the Copyright not reproduced in the case of the CD-ROM would be
Act defines ‘‘copyright’’ in a work as the ‘‘. . . sole right to problematic, however, because it indicates that the Court
produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part does not view the rights in newspapers as being layered
thereof in any material form whatever . . .’’. The Court over the rights in works. For, in the majority’s view, the
interpreted ‘‘in any material form’’ as denying that any- reproduction of the newspaper does not necessarily
thing can be done with the work once converted into reproduce in any material form whatever, the underlying
electronic form. Thus, instead of interpreting the repro- articles. This would save the independence of copyright,
duction right as unlimited, it imposed limits on it: but how can it be?
Media neutrality is reflected in s. 3(1) of the Copyright Of course, there are situations where one could
Act which describes a right to produce or reproduce a work reproduce a substantial part of the newspaper but not‘‘in any material form whatever’’. Media neutrality means
the underlying articles, as in the case where the layout ofthat the Copyright Act should continue to apply in different
the newspaper is produced without the articles. Theremedia, including more technologically advanced ones. But
it does not mean that once a work is converted into elec- could also be circumstances where a substantial part of
tronic data anything can then be done with it. The resulting the newspaper is reproduced, but only an insubstantial
work must still conform to the exigencies of the Copyright part of one or more articles is reproduced. But howAct. Media neutrality is not a license to override the rights of
could it be said that the entire newspaper was repro-authors — it exists to protect the rights of authors and
others as technology evolves. 35 duced (minus, perhaps, as in this case, some advertise-
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ments, graphic elements, daily information, birth and account, it might be said that the right of reproduction
death notices, and some design elements) but that the of the freelancers in their articles could be narrowed in a
originality of the articles was not reproduced? Given different way than is the right of reproduction of pub-
layered rights, doesn’t the reproduction of a compilation lishers in their newspapers and other collective works
necessarily involve reproducing the original underlying and compilations. One view is that only the initial repro-
works? duction of the individual articles in a newspaper would
be an exercise of the right to reproduce the articles.The minority believed that it did:
Subsequent reproduction of a newspaper would be anThe right of reproduction adheres equally to the ben-
exercise only of the publisher’s right to reproduce, andefit of authors of individual works and to those of collective
works or compilations. In considering the publisher’s right not the right of the owner of the copyright in an article.
of reproduction, the majority says that the line between the Hence, the publisher’s right to reproduce the newspaper
rights of individual authors and the rights of authors of with the articles contained in it does not exercise a free-
collective works should be drawn on the basis of whose lance author’s right to reproduce the articles since thatoriginality is being reproduced. This suggests that the
right had already been exercised by the author. Unfortu-databases in question reproduce only one group’s origi-
nality. This, with respect, seems to me to contradict the nately, this result is unsatisfactory. While it may preserve
essence of collective works and compilations, which inher- the independence of rights of newspaper publishers and
ently contain the ‘‘originality’’ of both the authors of indi- the owner of the copyright in the articles, it does so atvidual works as well as of the creator of the collective work
the expense of the layering of rights as ordinarily under-or compilation. Any reproduction of a collective work will
stood. 44necessarily involve the reproduction of both sets of origi-
nality. 43 There is a better rationale for why the reproduction
The majority did not directly respond to the of the articles in the CD-ROM in Robertson v. Thomson
minority counter-argument apart from its assertion that was not an infringement than the one just considered. It
the originality of the newspaper was not reproduced in is this. Robertson impliedly authorized the Globe and
any material form whatever in the Info Globe and CPI.Q Mail to reproduce her articles in its newspaper. 45 The
databases. This is not surprising, since the skill and judg- issue, then, is whether the scope of the authorization
ment embodied in the articles is necessarily reproduced extended to reproduction in the electronic databases. 46
when the entire newspaper is reproduced. Interpreting Since the Globe and Mail in the CD-ROM is a news-
the majority’s reasoning charitably, however, one could paper, or at least retains the nature or essence of the
maintain that the fact that the originality of the news- Globe and Mail newspaper, 47 and Robertson authorized
paper was not reproduced in the case of the Info Globe reproduction of her articles in the Globe and Mail news-
and CPI.Q databases was the reason there was no exer- paper, by implication she authorized the reproduction of
cise of the right of reproduction with respect to the her articles in the CD-ROM. In short, the Globe and
newspapers, but that the same reason does not account Mail’s right to reproduce its newspaper does not include
for the determination that there was no exercise of the the right to reproduce the articles contained in it, but
right of reproduction with respect to the underlying arti- there has been no infringement because the reproduc-
cles in the CD-ROM. tion of the articles was authorized by Robertson. This
solution to the issue in Robertson does not depend uponTo attempt to explain the determination that there
a supposed failure of the originality of the articles to beis no exercise of the reproduction right with respect to
reproduced in the CD-ROM and maintains both thethe articles on such an account, one could apply the
independence of copyrights and their layered nature.Court’s interpretation of ‘‘in any material form whatever’’
to limit the reproduction right in the articles. On such an
Notes:
1 2006 SCC 43 (CanLII) [Robertson]. of Background Music (2003–2009)’’, Copyright Board, online: <http://
www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/m20061020-b.pdf>, at 25 [Tariff No. 3].2 Ibid. at para 1.
3 Ibid. at paras. 1-2. 8 While there is no copyright to perform either a sound recording in public
4 Ibid. at para. 1. See infra note 18 for a discussion of the scope of authoriza- or to perform a performer’s performance fixed in that recording in public,
tion. there are rights of equitable remuneration under s. 19 of the Copyright
Act belonging to the performer and the maker attached to the perform-5 Ibid. at para. 6.
ance of the sound recording in public and its communication to the6 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42. public by telecommunication (not including a retransmission). Interest-
7 It should be noted that the terminology in Canada is inconsistent with ingly, starting in 1924, makers of sound recordings did hold the right to
respect to ‘‘neighbouring rights’’. The Copyright Act does not distinguish perform their recordings in public. In 1971, the Copyright Appeal Board
between neighbouring rights and copyrights. The rights in works, per- certified tariffs for such performances but that right was ended with
formers’ performances, sound recordings, and communications signals are subsequent amendments to the Copyright Act. Only in 1997 did makers
defined to be copyrights in s. 2 of the Act. Sometimes, the rights of of sound recordings and performers obtain the right to be remunerated.
remuneration of performers and makers of sound recordings provided for The royalties for the performance of sound recordings and their commu-
in s. 19 are called ‘‘neighbouring rights’’ because those are not copyrights, nication to the public by telecommunication are collected by the
but this usage is not consistent either. See ‘‘Tariff No. 3 — Use and Supply Neighbouring Rights Collective of Canada (NRCC). The Society of Com-
Layered Rights: Robertson v. Thomson 65
posers, Authors, and Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN) collects royal- 34 Ibid. at para. 51.
ties for the performance of the work in public under a number of separate 35 Ibid. at para. 49. It is odd that the majority did not explicitly refer to thetariffs. See ‘‘Tariff No. 3’’, ibid. at 1-2, 4-5, 59. balance between owners and users in this context while the minority
9 As it is put in ‘‘Mechanical Licensing Brochure’’, Canadian Musical Repro- does at para. 69. Moreover, in considering the balance of the rights of
duction Rights Agency, online: <http://www.cmrra.ca/cmrradocs/ owners and users in interpreting ‘‘in any material form’’, it would not
mlbe06.pdf> at 4 (emphasis in original), ‘‘[e]very recording of a copy- have limited reproduction in the way that the majority did since a
righted composition actually represents a blend of two copyrights: first, broader reproduction right would benefit the public’s interest in access to
the copyright in the musical composition itself — that which is repre- newspapers. At para. 76, the minority points out that ‘‘[t]he words ‘any
sented by the music publisher. Secondly, the recording of the musical material form whatever’ in s. 3(1) should be taken to mean what they say:
work is separately copyrighted . . . if you plan to reproduce a master owned the author’s exclusive right to reproduce a ‘substantial part’ of a copy-
by another party, you must obtain the permission of the owner of that righted work is not limited by changes in form or output made possible
recording, in addition to the necessary mechanical licenses’’. by a new medium’’.
10 An analogous result does hold in patent law with respect to pioneering 36 Ibid. at para. 41.
inventions and improvements thereto. Under s. 32 of the Patent Act,
37 Ibid. at para. 47.R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4, ‘‘[a]ny person who has invented any improvement on
any patented invention may obtain a patent for the improvement, but he 38 Ibid. at paras. 38, 52.
does not thereby obtain the right of making, vending or using the orig-
39 Ibid. at para. 52, where the Court says that ‘‘[t]o pass muster, a reproduc-inal invention, nor does the patent for the original invention confer the
tion does not need to be a replica or a photographic copy. But it doesright of making, vending or using the patented improvement’’.
need to remain faithful to the essence of the original work. And, in our11 Robertson, supra note 1 at paras. 11–18.
view, the CD-ROM does so by offering users, essentially, a compendium12 Ibid. at note 1 at para. 11. The Ontario Court of Appeal said at para. 96 of daily newspaper editions’’.
that ‘‘[a]lthough Robertson objects to the reproduction of her article in 40 Ibid. at para. 41. The Court also noted at para. 47, that ‘‘[v]iewed ‘globally’,the database, she concedes that the Globe was entitled to publish her
to use the language of this Court in CCH, Info Globe Online and CPI.Qarticles in its newspaper and to archive them on microfiche and micro-
are different selections than the selections that they incorporate. They arefilm. Since there was no agreement in writing with respect to one of the
compilations of individual articles presented outside of the context of thearticles, Robertson must be taken to implicitly agree that the Globe had a
original collective work from where they originated. The resulting collec-valid oral licence at least for these purposes’’. See Robertson v. Thomson
tive work presented to the public is not simply each of the collectiveCorp. (2004), 72 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.).
works joined together — it has become a collective work of a different13 Robertson, supra note 1 at paras. 11–18. nature’’. This finding is reminiscent of Hanfstaengl v. Empire Palace
14 These two perspectives are discussed by Cumming J. of the Motions [1894] 2 Ch. 1 at 4–10 (C.A.) in which tableaux vivants of persons posi-
Court, Robertson v. Thomson Corp. (2001), 15 C.P.R. (4th) 147 (Ont. Sup. tioned and dressed exactly like the persons in a painting was presented at
Ct. J.), at paras. 111–128, and by the Ontario Court of Appeal, supra note an exhibition. The Court found there that there was no reproduction of
12 at paras. 61–69. the painting ‘‘by any means’’ because the reproduction was by ‘‘totally
different means’’ such that it did not compete in the marketplace with15 Robertson, supra note 1 at paras. 4, 51-52.
the original. This contrasts with a finding of infringement in Rogers v.16 Ibid. at para. 3. Koons, 960 F. 2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992), where a sculpture of puppies created
17 Ibid. at para. 4, the Court says that ‘‘ . . . we believe the CD-ROMs are a by Koons incorporated the composition, poses, and the expressions from
valid exercise of the Globe’s right to reproduce its collective work’’. At a photograph of puppies whose copyright was owned by Rogers.
paragraph 52 it notes: ‘‘Nevertheless, the Court’s conclusion was reached 41 Ibid. at para. 52.solely on the basis of the s. 3 rights of the Globe and Mail. It said at
para. 51 that, ‘[i]n our view, the CD-ROMs are a valid exercise of the 42 Ibid. at para. 34.
Globe’s right to reproduce its collective works (or a substantial part 43 Ibid. at para. 82 (emphasis in original). As in the case of the majority,thereof) pursuant to s. 3(1) of the Copyright Act’’’.
however, the minority appears to endorse the idea that the right of the18 Ibid. at paras 57-58, the Court noted that ‘‘[t]here was conflicting evi- Globe and Mail to reproduce its collective works under s. 3 implies the
dence before the motions judge regarding the scope of such an alleged right to reproduce the underlying works irrespective of the authorization
implied license. The content of these licenses is a live issue that should go of owners of the copyright in the articles. Despite the fact that the
to trial, as ordered by the motions judge. If it is determined that freelance originality of the underlying works is necessarily copied when the collec-
authors have in fact impliedly licensed the Globe the right to republish tive work is itself copied, the minority said, at para. 83, that ‘‘ . . . this does
their articles in the electronic databases, this decision will, of course, be of not bar the creator of a collective work, such as a newspaper, from
less practical significance’’. reprinting the newspaper. On the contrary, creators of collective works,
like authors of individual works, have the ‘sole right’ under s. 3 to19 Ibid. at para. 33.
produce and reproduce their works, which in the case of the former will20 Copyright Act, supra note 6, s. 2. necessarily include the originality of contributing authors . . . ’’. The
21 Ibid. minority adds that no unfairness would be created since the ‘‘ability to
produce a collective work in the first place depends on the individual22 Robertson, supra note 1 at para.  6.
authors’ authorization to use the materials that form the compilation’’.23 Ibid. at para. 31.
44 Moreover, part of this understanding is that the nature of the rights in24 Ibid. at para. 2 (emphasis added).
works does not depend upon whether the works are part of a newspaper.25 Ibid. at para. 1 (emphasis added). As the Court itself noted in Robertson, at para. 30, s. 2.1(2) of the Copy-
right Act confirms that ‘‘[t]he mere fact that a work is included in a26 This interpretation is suggested by Robertson, ibid. at para. 7, where the
compilation does not increase, decrease or otherwise affect the protectionCourt said: ‘‘[i]t is undisputed that freelance authors have the right to
conferred by this Act in respect of the copyright in the work’’.reproduce their individual works. The extent and scope of a publisher’s
right to reproduce those same articles as part of its right to reproduce its 45 Robertson at para. 11. See also the discussion at supra note 12.
newspaper is less clear’’.
46 There was conflicting evidence on the scope of any license and the case27 Robertson, supra, note 1 at paras. 2, 34.
was decided independently of the scope of any license. See Robertson, at28 Ibid. at para. 34. para. 57.
29 Ibid. 47 Robertson at para. 63. The Court decided that it was not necessary to
30 [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 [CCH]. determine whether the electronic databases constituted a newspaper not-
withstanding that it believed that CPI.Q and Info Globe Online were not31 Ibid. at para. 16.
newspapers since the databases were of a different nature than the print32 Ibid. at para. 33 (emphasis in original), cited in Robertson, supra note 1 at newspaper. It could have quite easily inferred, thought it did not, that the
para. 36. CD-ROM was a newspaper given that the essence of the newspaper was
33 Robertson, ibid. at para. 41. preserved in the CD-ROM (at para. 53).
